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In 2004, Herbert Kronke made the “Case for Principles of Conflict of Laws.”​[1]​ His proposal for a global restatement of private international law was modelled on the successful UNIDROIT Principles of International and Commercial Contracts, which came out in their second, expanded version that same year.​[2]​ However, despite some regional or sector-specific projects, Kronke’s proposal has not yet been taken up, at least not comprehensively.​[3]​ Multiple reasons appear plausible: European scholars were occupied with the communinatarization of private international law; UNIDROIT (which Kronke directed at the time) prioritized other projects; methodical differences between legal traditions were too daunting; other issues seemed more pressing. But it may also be the case that restating private international presents new challenges, different from those present in a restatement of substantive private law like contract law.
This is what this article aims to determine, in the brevity required by its format. It does not answer whether or not a restatement of private international law should be made. Its more modest goal is to lay out both the specific promises and the pitfalls that would be involved in such a project. Comprehensively restating private international law on a global sphere would be significantly different from restating substantive laws; the process could be extremely informative for that reason alone.
Restatements
The idea of a global restatement has been most successful in the area of contract law.​[4]​ The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (UPICC) still stand as the most impressive achievement among global restatements: they have influenced legislation, have been applied in arbitration, and have spurred a remarkable wealth of scholarship.​[5]​ For their creation, scholars and (to a lesser extent) practitioners came together and discussed, on the basis of fairly extensive comparative law studies, how existing contract laws in different legal orders could be synthesized into a common body.​[6]​ Their method, inspired by the US Restatement of the Law, was in part descriptive and in part constructive: where they found commonalities they restated those, but where they found differences they picked what seemed to them the better rule, or indeed developed a new rule altogether.​[7]​ The biggest reason for the success of the UPICC, however, certainly lies in their form as legal rules, which allows them to serve as focal points in discussions and in legal reasoning.
Contract law may seem an obvious candidate for a global restatement due to the transnational role of contracts. But in many ways private international law may seem an even more plausible area: it is intrinsically transnational, it rests on a long history of comparisons, and it is an area in which uniformity of results seems even more desirable than in substantive law. Indeed, on an abstract level this has long been recognized. Savigny’s treatise on private international law already seems to lay out the foundation for such a project:​[8]​
“If the development of [private international law] is not disturbed by unforeseen external circumstances, it may be expected that it will at length lead to a complete accord in the treatment of questions of collision in all states. Such an accord might be brought about by means of juridical science, and the practice of the tribunals guided by it. It could also be affected by a positive law, agreed to and enacted by all states, with respect to the collision of territorial laws. … [T]he notion of such a law may serve as a standard to test every rule that we shall lay down as to collision. We have always to ask ourselves whether such a rule would be well adapted for reception into that common statute law of all nations.”
We find here the combination, characteristic of Savigny’s oeuvre, of three elements: the recognition of an organic convergence of existing law, the case for scholarly systematization of the recognized convergence, and the potential for legislation on the basis of that systematization.​[9]​ Notably, these elements are characteristic also of restatements, or principles. Restatements, like the UNIDROIT Principles, operate as scholarly systematization of recognized convergence, but in addition to this descriptive function they function also as model laws, andthey even offer themselves as actually applicable law. ​[10]​  The model has been quite successful in the area of substantive contract law. But Savigny’s quote suggests that it would be especially promising for private international law, given the field’s transnational focus and tradition.
At first, this seems clearly true. Private international law seems like an ideal candidate for a global restatement, almost regardless of the broader theoretical approach one follows. For those who view private international law as, essentially, a subset of international law, a global restatement of that law appears to be a logical choice—in line, if you will, with the project of codification and progressive development of public international law.​[11]​ For those who view private international law as domestic law, the international divergence of private international law regimes has long been viewed as a problem (Kegel famously called it the cancer of the discipline)​[12]​ and legislative unification a desirable solution. Finally, and perhaps most pertinently, the third school of private international law, which argues for a coherent transnational private international law regime on the basis of a (functional) comparison of domestic regimes, should be sympathetic to a global restatement of private international law, given that such a restatement describes as (presumable) similarities between different legal regimes in their application, despite their undeniable differences regarding the law in the books.
And yet, experience has shown that private international law in reality has not lent itself easily to a restatement on a global level. Legislative unification was successful for some time, but the Hague Conference has in recent years moved from choice of law to procedure (which has also proved contentious), and the European legislative project in private international law is neither global nor truly interstate.
Predecessors
The idea of restating the private international law of multiple jurisdictions emerged in the United States with the US Restatement of the Law, the nonbinding US equivalent to a European codification. There, the first two Restatements of conflict of laws have met with mixed success. The First Restatement, which codified, under the leadership of Joseph Beale, the vested rights theory, was soon overcome by developments in practice.​[13]​ The Second Restatement, with its attempt to combine the plethora of methodological proposals existing at the time, has been widely followed only in its most general provision, namely section 6, which lays down the proper considerations for a court.​[14]​ Whether the Third Restatement, currently being developed, will be more successful remains to be seen. Regardless of the difficulties in the courts, the Restatement has always served as both a significant scholarly achievement and as a relevant focal point for discussions. 
On a transnational level, comprehensive and global statements of this sort do not yet exist. What does exist are, on the one hand, sector-specific restatements. Several restatements exist on conflict of laws in intellectual property; the International Law Association aims at consolidating them.​[15]​ The private international law of contracts is codified in the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Contracts.​[16]​ Both are, however, more model laws than careful descriptive restatements, aimed in wide areas at improving, not describing the law. The ingenious solutions provided by the Hague Principles to the problems of conflicting standard terms and the applicability of non-state law, for example, are deliberate law reform projects.
On the other hand, we see an emergence of regional restatement projects. The US Restatement may not count as regional, given that it exists within a federal system. European private international law is legislative and therefore largely not in need of being restated. However, we see regional restatements elsewhere. In Asia, new regional Principles of Private International Law are being finalized;​[17]​ for Africa, a similar project is ongoing.​[18]​ A new “Guide on international contracts in the Americas” lays out private international law, though not in the form of a restatement. These projects deserve praise: they bring together and consolidate private international law in regions where it has long been somewhat negleced. At the same time, the two actual restatements appear, quite often, relatively conservative: focused on rules rather than applications, and more derivative of European predecessors than one might imagine with regard to the reality of law in these regions.
European private international law, which is by now largely codified (except in its general part) provides an important model for a global restatement, but not a perfect model. It does bring together different traditions (especially continental and English) but not all that exist globally. Moreover, its nature as legislation creates differences: EU law is not explicitly comparative, it rests on specific European policy goals that are not necessarily universalizable. Moreover, the fact that it is legislation has an impact. On the one hand, a restatement can be bolder: it can provide rules even in areas of political disagreement, and simply lay out different perspectives in the notes. On the other hand, a restatement can be more modest: it does not have to find a response to every problem. 
Finally, we find a new interest in scholarly presentations of global private international law. The new Encyclopedia of Private International Law provides access to the laws of many countries and comparative analyses on a wide array of topics.​[19]​ Symeonides has produced an excellent comparative survey of private international law codifications worldwide.​[20]​ In additons, we see the emergence of globally comparative textbooks.​[21]​ Such books are comprehensive even though, unlike restatements, do not come in the peculiar form of legal rules.
Peculiarities
Why is it hard to restate private international law, harder perhaps than for areas of substantive law like contracts or torts or even family law? Two reasons stand out: variation and complexity. Both are related.
Variation
A first reason is variation—not only, perhaps not even primarily, of concrete outcomes and decisions, but rather on the level of methodology and the level of foundations. As concerns methodology, some significant differences reflect different legal traditions: the common law has always approached private international law in ways that differ from the approaches in civil law systems. Within each of these traditions,  national approaches differ: French private international law differs from the German version, and US private international law is far removed from English private international law. Finally, methodological differences exist even within legal traditions: European private international law is characterized by a duality of traditional private international law rules and rules of recognition,​[22]​ and the plethora of approaches in the United States has become so great as to make meaningful conversation hard.​[23]​
Arguably, these methodological differences concern not merely the technical question of how to reach agreed-upon ends. Rather, the field is characterized also by foundational differences concerning the very goals of the discipline, the very questions it aims at answering, and the very paradigms within which it is negotiated. Is the goal uniformity of results or application of the most appropriate law; the balancing of state interests or the protection of rights and persons? Is the question of  private international law which law should apply in a given situation, or is it the scope of a given law? Are the paradigms of private international law derived from private law, or from international law, or from elsewhere?
This variety of methods and foundations is greater than in substantive law areas; it is reminiscent of the variety existing in legal theory and jurisprudence. Indeed, private international law shares more with legal theory than is apparent. Like legal theory, private international law views law as its object: it is a discipline of law. And in parallel to legal theory, private international law must take a position on law. In this way, a restatement would have to become something akin to a legal theory drafted in doctrinal language, an anomaly indeed.
Technicality
While private international law may resemble legal theory in one way, in another it is diametrically opposed, namely in its technical character. Outsiders often perceive private international law as overly complex; this perception is sometimes shared by insiders. And yet, attempts to simplify the field have mostly failed: the attempts in the US conflicts revolution to overcome the artificiality and complexity of the traditional method have led to staggering complexities;​[24]​ the attempt to replace private international law doctrine with economic reasoning has largely replicated the complexities of doctrine in a different language.​[25]​ This suggests that the complexity of tools like renvoi, characterization, substitution is irreducible because the problems they respond to are themselves complex. Kegel’s ladder of connecting factors may disappoint those looking for systematic coherence, but it is an adequate technical response to the diversity of situations that may occur.​[26]​
Private international law, more than contract law, is a technique.​[27]​ Contract law can be reduced, in large parts, to underlying considerations of interests involved; it can be based on a conception of justice (even though people may differ on what that conception is, or how issues like efficiency and equity should be balanced). Private international law, by contrast, always mediates between different conceptions of justice and is for that reason not as easily reducible. It is no coincidence, therefore, that private international law tends to resort to technique, as a way to make otherwise irresoluble conflicts manageable.​[28]​
Uses
In view of these peculiarities of private international law, of what use would a restatement be? Three uses seem most important: one practical, one theoretical, and one social. A first use of a restatement, both most obvious and most similar to that of contracts restatement, is practical. A global restatement could go a long way towards the unification of private international law that would not only enhance uniformity of results but also greatly facilitate interactions between different legal orders. It could provide a blueprint for global legislation. But it could also provide a model for domestic lawmakers and adjudicators. 
Of course, a uniform text does not automatically lead to uniform results, as experience with European private international law has demonstrated.​[29]​ This is not a disadvantage at all. First, unification creates more uniformity, even if uniformity is not perfect. Second, uniformity of approach already matters a lot, even short of uniformity of result. Third, the different ways in which adjudicators apply a similar text would in turn be instructive for the understanding of remaining differences. 
In addition to its practical use, there is a theoretical use for a global restatement. Private international law is, intrinsically, globally focused, even if most of it remains national. Establishing the extent to which a common understanding exists would be of immense theoretical relevance. Do different private international laws, despite their doctrinal differences, ultimately represent similar ideas? Or are they representative of different paradigms? A restatement would be an indispensable element in an inductively established response to such questions.
Although this use is here called theoretical, it has practical implications as well. A global restatement would give scholars and practitioners access to global knowledge, and it would do so in the form of legal rules. A global restatement would enable domestic lawmakers and adjudicators to determine to what extent their own approaches are in tune with the global trend, and then to determine whether existing differences were representative of important values (and thus worthy of maintaining) or purely idiosyncratic (and thus worth abandoning).
Finally, a global restatement has a social use: the creation of a global community of private international law. Such a community once existed, and it is being rebuilt, this occurring through the courses of the Hague Academy, the biennial conference of the Journal of Private International Law, the foundation of a European Society of Private International Law, and the spontaneous discussions in the reading room or even the cafeteria of the Hamburg Max Planck Institute. Nonetheless, mutual misunderstandings still abound. Kronke rightly pointed out, with regard to negotiations towards a Hague Judgments Convention, that “the various ‘camps’ have lost their ability to even communicate and openly discuss factual assumptions”.​[30]​ The need to work together towards a restatement could intensify this community-building. And the result, in turn, could serve as “a lexicon-instrument, designed as a vehicle capable of circumnavigating potentially damaging analytical doldrums, spaces of incommunicability”.​[31]​
This social use is closely connected to the practical and the theoretical uses. The construction of a common text requires the existence of an epistemic community, a community of individuals involved in a common epistemological framework, within which different views become communicable and commensurable. 
Form
What should be the outcome of the process? On the one hand, a mere scholarly presentation of the existing common core of private international law would not be sufficient. It is important to restate the law in the form of rules, for three related reasons. First, only such a formulation forces the author to take an actual choice, to move from the abstract formulation of policies to the concrete formulation of functional ools. Second, due to the technical character of private international law mentioned earlier, only a formulation as rules is a proper description of private international law, because private international law cannot be stripped of its technical character without losing its nature. Third, rules provide especially non-official (re)statements of the law with a particular authority that they need in order to be successful.​[32]​
On the other hand, a global binding code of private international law (e.g. in the form of a treaty) would be an illusion and not necessarily desirable. A model law, to be adopted by legislators, seems more attractive, but it would face the significant differences in legal culture and tradition existing among different states. It is also far from clear that knowledge is already sufficient for the establishment of a model code.
The solution, then, is an actual restatement, in the form of principles like the UPICC. Such a restatement would come in the form of rules (or, occasionally, more open-ended principles). It would need to contain detailed comments, ideally with the amount of detail familiar from the US Restatement (and thus more than, for example, the UPICC). A restatement must significantly synthesize existing material; that process needs to be documented in such comments.
The rules themselves would not achieve uniformity of result. That is not a great shortcoming. In private international law, due to the great variation of possible cases, it is both necessary and sufficient to provide the adjudicator with a proper technique, not to determine outcomes. What matters is the considerable variety of possible rule formulations: specific rules, broad principles, or even just lists of factors (as in sec. 6 of the US Restatement 2d).
Finally, a restatement can safely be open-ended. Of course, it may be helpful to have specified escape clauses.​[33]​ A restatement should lay down typical factors allowing application of a public policy exception (e.g. Art. 6 2d sentence German Introductory Act to the Civil Code), and it should lay down in some detail what a closer connection would be (e.g. Art. 4(2)(2) Rome II Regulation). A general escape clause, by contrast, that merely says that a rule does not apply in exceptional cases without laying down criteria is unnecessary. A restatement is not binding: an adjudicator who generally wants to follow it is always free to deviate where that seems justified. More importantly, given the diversity and unpredictability of foreign laws that private international law must deal with, private international law rules are always and necessarily somewhat incomplete: they must always be adapted to the specific case constellation.​[34]​ In this sense, it is impossible to codify comprehensively, and it is consequently impossible to create a comprehensive restatement. 
Content
The content of a global restatement is determined by some of the peculiarities of the discipline. First, as to scope. On the one hand, it seems appropriate to leave out, at least at first, matters of procedure, especially jurisdiction and the recognition of foreign judgments, and focus on matters of choice of law. Choice of law is not more important than the others, but it is the area in which a common intellectual understanding is the most important. This would make the restatement narrower than the Asian Principles. Similarly, the law of nationality should not be part of the restatement, except as a connecting factor.
On the other hand, private international law is closely related to other areas of law—free movement provisions (in the EU and in global trade law),​[35]​ human rights law,​[36]​ and others. A proper understanding of contemporary private international law must look beyond existing doctrinal limits and focus on what is functionally private international law. A global restatement, which must already account for different doctrinal formulations in different legal traditions, provides an excellent opportunity for the incorporation of related disciplines that deal with the conflict of laws.
With regard to specific areas of private international law, a restatement would, ideally, be comprehensive. However, it seems appropriate to start with areas that are easier to restate and relatively more important. Contracts and intellectual property offer themselves here—preliminary work already exists, and both fields have a significant transnational dimension. Family law would be harder to do but arguably at least as important; the same is true for corporate law. Regulatory laws—antitrust, securities regulation, etc.—would also be fruitful. To a large extent, such specific areas could be developed in relative independence of each other, at least at first.
Of course, a piecemeal approach would eventually create a problem of coherence. This leads to the problem of restating the general part of private international law. Here, we face a bit of a conundrum. On the one hand, the general part is particularly difficult to restate. It is here that the biggest variations lie (though a recent study claims that some coherence can be found.)​[37]​ It is not surprising, therefore, that EU regulations have focused on specific areas first and that discussions for a Rome 0 Regulation have not yet yielded results.​[38]​ On the other hand, the general part is of particular importance. Admittedly, it does not have the same reputation everywhere as it does in Germany: English private international law, they receive far less attention than in Germany in France; in the United States, general part tools like renvoi and incidental questions are often dismissed altogether as “escape devices”. But methodological and technical questions are, unavoidably, important elements of the discussion in these traditions, too. In the end, the goal should be to restate also a general part, even though the work will be the most difficult: in assembling and comparing existing materials, in determining the extent to which differences are superficial or foundational, and in putting findings into the form of rules.
The current restatement process in the US is a case on point for both desirability and difficulties. The general reporter suggested at first that methodological debates had blinded observers to the existing level of convergence in US private international law, and expressed the hope that a new Restatement could largely avoid those issues of methodology.​[39]​ He proposed that his own two-step approach—to first identify a conflict and, if one exists, to then resolve it—could capture all existing methods.​[40]​ This seems doubtful. Some approaches—the European being among them—are based on the designation of the applicable law regardless of the existence of a conflict. Furthermore, this level of generality does notcapture the significant differences between existing methods. Not surprisingly, therefore, the claim has been dropped in later drafts of the Restatement. At the time of writing, it seems safe to say that conflicts between different methods have not been resolved in the Restatement. ​[41]​ 
Material
What material should a global restatement draw on? First of course legislative and quasi-legislative texts: existing codifications of the world,​[42]​ but also existing restatements like the US Restatement and the Asian Principles. Such texts served as models for the UPICC; they are even more important for private international law, where other sources are scarcer. Of course, just as for the UPICC, it is necessary to create a text that is sufficiently detached from any one national model.  
In addition, a global restatement must rest on decisions of courts. Court decisions represent the reality of law—in uncodified systems almost exclusively. In private international law, more than in many other disciplines, courts and not legislators have developed many of the now familiar doctrines  (one need think only of renvoi or party autonomy.) Some court-developed doctrines still remain uncodified altogether. At the same time, ourt decisions provide less reliable guidance in private international law  than in other disciplines. The wealth of potential constellations involving different laws makes many court decisions idiosyncratic: the next case, involving different laws, may already raise different issues and therefore lead to a different result. The value of court decisions for a restatement, therefore, lies less in their concrete results and more in the avenues they provide to obtain and justify such results.
Finally, scholarship ust play a greater role for a restatement of private international law than it would in other areas of the law. Scholarship has always been especially important for the discipline, for several reasons—the relative paucity of case law, the complex and technical nature of the discipline, the close proximity with legal theory, the difficulty in creating cohesion. All these reasons play a role for a restatement. Scholarship is especially relevant where it provides for proper understanding and systematization of existing legislative and case law. But scholarship can matter even where it does not reflect existing laws because it can create generalizable understandings that transcend national contexts. In this sense, doctrine can function as pre-technique of private international law, so to speak.
Process
How can such a restatement be put together? The project could borrow from experience made in domestic and international restatements. Working groups should be diverse in terms of geography and legal traditions represented; they should also come from both academia and practice. The actual formulation of rules and the comments would need to be assigned to one or (more likely) several reporters.
Nonetheless, the peculiar nature of private international law, as opposed to contract law, invites some modifications to the process. In contract law, the process is a relatively straightforward two-stage process familiar from early formulations of functional comparison. In a first step, existing material is compared, without regard to its specific formulation, to determine commonalities and differences. In the second step, the found commonalities (and, in case of differences, the solutions deemed superior) are then translated into a rule structure. In private international law, due to its technical nature, this process is harder. On the one hand, it is much more difficult to determine whether similarities and differences exist, due to both the variation of existing methodologies and the relative paucity and idiosyncrasy of existing case material. On the other hand, translating found solutions into rule structures is more challenging because resulting rules may have to operate in very different legal frameworks.
In contract law, the process for a restatement can rest on functionalist comparison in the way in which Konrad Zweigert discussed it: solutions from different legal systems are first decontextualized (stripped down to their functions), and then the results of this process are used to build a system.​[43]​ Functional comparison should play a role also for a private international law restatement, but with two additions. First, attention should be paid not just to functional similarities, but also to differences on the fundamental level of paradigms.​[44]​ Second, the process must take seriously, at every stage of the process, the inherently and irreducibly technical nature of private international law. Private international law is not merely about ends, or functions, because the ends are inextricably interlinked with the ways in which they are reached. What matters in a restatement is less the prescription of outcomes and more the prescription of methods and techniques. 
If this is correct, then a restatement cannot easily proceed in the traditional manner, with country reports and a general reporter, and perhaps ad hoc discussions on specific areas. A general reporter will rarely have a sufficient understanding of different methods; without immersion she will be susceptible to errors. Country reports are hard to provide on matters of technique. All in all, the risk of mutual misunderstanding is particularly great in private international law. A restatement process would probably need to rest on a process of immersion and collaboration: participants would need to spend considerable time understanding each other, perhaps working together towards the formulation of rules that are actually representative of different approaches.
Example
It is (of course) too early to already present what must stand at the end of the process, namely the formulation of rules based on detailed comparative and technical work. Nonetheless, an example can already demonstrate some of the possibilities and limits of a restatement. I choose a rather well-known one: the common home exception to the lex loci principle. In many jurisdictions in the world, if the tortfeasor and victim share the same home through nationality or domicile, that law, rather than the law of the place of the tort, will govern some or all of the tort claims between them.​[45]​ Significant differences exist between different legal systems in this regard. First, the exception does not exist in all legal systems—though the absence of a legislative rule does not alone predict how courts would decide the issue. Second, the relevant connecting factor is different: domicile in US law, common habitual residence in EU law, common nationality in old German private international law. Third, the scope of the exception differs. In US law, the common domicile rule is confined to issues of loss allocation, while issues of conduct regulation remain governed by the law of the place of the tort. In EU law, the rule is not so confined, although the common home exception does not apply in full for rules of safety and conduct Art. 17(2) Rome II Regulation), in essence conduct-regulating rules.
How should a restatement account for all of this? On the one hand, it seems safe to establish the common home rule as a general principle, despite the jurisdictions that have not adopted it. On the other hand, the existing differences have to be accounted for. As to differences concerning the relevant connecting factor, a restatement has two ways of dealing with this. One is to defer to the part in the restatement in which “home” or the equivalent personal affiliation is discussed and restated, because the connecting factor for the common home exception is typically a consequence of that decision taken elsewhere by the respective legal system. Another is to simply leave an open notion like “home” in the text and leave specific interpretation of the term to the respective user. This will not lead to uniformity of results, but that seems defensible in view of existing differences. It does, however, lead to a high level of uniformity of approach.
A more difficult question is how to deal with the fact that the common home exception is general in the Rome II Regulation, but confined to issues of loss-allocation in US private international law. In response, a restatement can do several things. First, it can assess to which extent the difference is genuinely reflected in case law. It may be that the difference matters little in reality. Second, a restatement can determine to what extent an existing difference rests on different conceptions of substantive law, outside the scope of the restatement. In the United  States, the distinction between loss-allocating and conduct-regulating rules rests on an understanding of most tort law as aimed at setting incentives for proper conduct—conduct regulation. By contrast, the European legislature assumed that tort law is aimed at making victims whole—loss allocation. 
Conclusion
In view of all of these findings, would it be worthwhile to begin work towards a global restatement? From a practical perspective, the answer is not obvious. A restatement would require a great amount of work from many people; whether the result would justify these efforts practically is uncertain. By contrast, the theoretical payoff of the process would potentially be enormous. One thing that made the process leading to the Hague Principles so rewarding is the considerable methodological work that was needed to achieve a commonly agreed text; such work is valuable in itself. Finally, the social use of such a product would be especially great: the need to work together on a commonly constructed work would greatly strengthen the discipline’s epistemic community.
Private international law is a technique. This does not mean that either theoretical or empirical  work is unnecessary. Untheorized technique, as it sometimes exists in the formalism of private international law, is unproductive or even harmful. Mere formalis, without regard to outcomes, is irresponsible. But theoretical and empirical work alone are not enough: the truth of private international law lies in its technicality. A restatement would be a promising way to turn theory and empirics, derived from comparison and abstraction, back into technique. That would be progress for the discipline. 
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